Audit and compliance
Qry's compliance posture rests on three pillars:
- Audit logs — every privileged action is recorded.
- Soft-delete with retention — deletes are recoverable for a finite window.
- Data-subject support — admins can fulfil GDPR-style requests (access, rectification, erasure) from the admin panel.
This page is for the admin who has to answer "who accessed table X last week?" or "a former employee invoked their right to erasure, what do I do?".
Audit log
What's recorded
Every action that affects another user, another user's data, or tenant configuration:
- User management (create, role change, deactivate).
- Datasource config (add, edit, remove, credential change).
- RBAC / ABAC / DAC grant changes.
- License events (validation, key rotation).
- Admin overrides (DAC override, conversation read by admin).
- ABAC enforcement decisions (Layer 2, both
enforceblocks andaudit_onlywould-block events). - Scheduled task creation / edit / pause / delete.
- API gateway calls against data products.
- Forge wave deploys.
What's not recorded in the audit log (these have separate, structured logs):
- Routine LLM inference calls.
- Routine database queries by users in normal use.
- Conversation content (live in the conversation; visible to admins via DAC override).
Where to read it
Admin > Audit log. Filter by:
- Time range.
- Actor (user id).
- Action type.
- Affected resource.
Each entry shows: timestamp, actor, action, target, before/after where applicable, source IP. Export to CSV for downstream audit tooling.
Retention
Default: 2 years for audit log entries. Configurable in Admin > System Settings > Compliance > Audit retention.
Audit log entries are never purged by user removal — they reference user ids that stay in the database for audit purposes. This is the correct behaviour for compliance: a removed user's actions remain attributable.
Changes to skills and assistant memory
Changes to shared skills, to workspaces' assistant memory and to the governance settings have their own record, with the text before and after each change and who approved it: see The change record. An administrator can erase a skill's or note's past text there when it holds personal data.
Soft-delete model
Almost everything that "deletes" in Qry is soft-deleted with a deleted_at timestamp, then permanently removed by a cleanup cronjob after a retention window.
| Asset | Retention | Recovery |
|---|---|---|
| Conversations | 30d (auto-checkpoint) / 60d (manual checkpoint) — see Checkpoints and rewind | Admin can restore within window |
| Notebooks | 90d | Admin |
| Dashboards | 30d (default) | Admin |
| Workspaces | 30d | Admin |
| Scheduled tasks | 30d | Admin |
| Files (uploaded to a workspace) | 30d in workspace storage backend | Re-upload from source |
| Users | 90d | Admin |
| Audit log entries | 2y (no soft-delete; hard retention) | n/a |
The cleanup cronjob runs nightly. After the retention window, recovery is impossible.
Eager-load gotcha
The soft-delete model means eager loads must filter on deleted_at IS NULL (typically via .and_(Message.deleted_at.is_(None))). Skipping the filter surfaces "deleted" rows in user-facing pages — which is wrong. This is a backend invariant; if you write reports that read directly from the DB, respect it.
GDPR / data-subject requests
Right to access
A user (or authorised third party) requests "what data do you hold about me?"
In Admin > Users > {user} > Data export. Generates a tarball with:
- Every conversation, notebook, dashboard, scheduled task, and saved query they created.
- Every memory entry scoped to them personally.
- Their account metadata (name, email, role, group memberships).
- Audit log entries where they were the actor.
The tarball is downloadable for 7 days, then auto-deleted.
Right to rectification
A user wants their name or email changed. Edit in Admin > Users > {user}. Audit log entry recorded.
Right to erasure
A user requests "delete everything you have about me". The pattern:
- Confirm the request is legitimate (admin step — Qry doesn't authenticate the request).
- Reassign or delete owned content — workspaces / dashboards / notebooks the user owned. Either transfer ownership or delete.
- Erase the user account — Admin > Users > {user} > Erase (GDPR). This is more aggressive than Remove — it overwrites name / email with random tokens, hard-deletes personal memory entries (workspace memory stays for the team's continuity), and triggers immediate cleanup of soft-deleted conversations and files.
- Audit — the erasure itself is logged (with the random-token id, not the original).
After erasure, the user's actions in the audit log are still attributable to a user-id-with-erased-pii, which is the typical GDPR compromise: identification is gone, accountability for past actions remains.
Right to data portability
The export from Right to access is in JSON / CSV / standard formats — directly portable to other tools. No proprietary lock-in.
Tenant-level data isolation
For multi-tenant deployments, each tenant has its own:
- Database (
qrydb_<id>). - Memorystore Valkey instance.
- Namespace.
- License.
Cross-tenant data leakage is impossible at the data layer (no shared tables; query routing enforces tenant scoping). The only cross-tenant resource is the GKE cluster itself + the Cloud SQL Postgres instance (separate DBs per tenant).
For data-residency-sensitive tenants, a separate cluster (e.g. EU-only) is the path; multi-tenant in one cluster shares the cluster's residency.
Encryption at rest
- PostgreSQL — Cloud SQL has encryption at rest by default. On a self-managed cluster, use storage that encrypts at rest.
- Datasource credentials — Fernet-encrypted in the DB, key derived from
JWT_SECRET_KEYvia SHA-256. - Backups / dumps — encrypt before archiving outside the cluster.
Encryption in transit
- All public traffic via Traefik with cert-manager-issued Let's Encrypt certificates.
- Internal cluster traffic — Kubernetes service-to-service is plain HTTP; rely on the cluster's network policy to prevent eavesdropping. For tenants with stricter requirements, mTLS sidecars (Istio / Linkerd) can be enabled.
Common issues
An auditor needs proof that user X had access to table Y on date Z.
Audit log filtered by (actor = X) AND (action = "query") AND (target ~ Y) and time-range Z. Export to CSV for the auditor.
A user's data export tarball is missing some content. Workspace conversations they participated in but didn't create are not in their export — those are workspace-owned, not user-owned. The export captures personal artifacts only.
ABAC audit_only mode is logging hits but the user reported they couldn't query.
Different mechanism: audit_only doesn't block; the failure was at a different layer (RBAC or DAC). Check the user's Effective permissions.
Cleanup cronjob hasn't run.
celery-beat not scheduling, or the task is failing silently. Check qry_scheduled_task_failures_total for the cleanup task name.
A removed user is still listed as the author of conversations. Correct behaviour. Remove ≠ erase. For GDPR-mandated erasure, use Erase (GDPR) which overwrites the name.
See also
- Users and groups — user lifecycle including erase-vs-remove.
- Monitoring and health — log topology and operational signals.
- License management — what the license guarantees about retention.
- ABAC — audit-mode policies as a soft-rollout tool.